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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                           
_____________ 
 
No. 10-4632 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
HAROLD FITZGERALD, 
           Appellant 
 
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware                                                             
District Court  No. 1-08-cr-00147-001 
District Judge: The Honorable Leonard P. Stark  
                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 10, 2012 
 
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  September 13, 2012) 
                              
_____________________ 
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_____________________                              
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Smith, Circuit Judge. 
Harold Fitzgerald challenges his conviction by a jury on multiple counts 
related to a conspiracy to smuggle and sell drugs.  We will affirm.1
Fitzgerald’s involvement with his co-conspirators pre-dated the charged 
conspiracy.  Robert Shepherd testified to Fitzgerald’s close relationship with and 
performance of tasks for Andele Johnson, who purchased drugs from Vanivan 
Fuller, a dealer in Texas, and directed their sale in Philadelphia and the 
surrounding area.  Fuller testified that he spoke frequently with Fitzgerald to 
coordinate shipments of drugs and money.  After Johnson’s arrest, his childhood 
friend Shepherd took over the operation.  Shepherd testified that he often fronted 
cocaine to Fitzgerald because he repaid his debts.  Bradley Torrence, who assisted 
Shepherd in the operation, testified that he sold Fitzgerald cocaine while Shepherd 
was out of town and that he did not require full payment because of Fitzgerald’s 
close relationship with Shepherd. 
 
This pre-conspiracy evidence demonstrates Fitzgerald’s intent during his 
involvement in the charged conspiracy, which began in March 2006, following 
Torrence’s arrest.  During the charged conspiracy, Shepherd and Fitzgerald 
received shipments of cocaine from Fuller.  Some of the cocaine belonged to 
Fuller.  Shepherd and Fitzgerald were expected to sell it and ship the profits back 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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to him.  The remainder was paid for in advance by Shepherd and Fitzgerald and 
belonged to them.  Fuller testified that Fitzgerald informed him on multiple 
occasions that some of the cocaine belonged specifically to Fitzgerald, as 
Fitzgerald had used his own money to purchase it.  Shepherd testified that he and 
Fitzgerald jointly scouted vacant apartments to which the packages of cocaine 
could be safely shipped and that Fitzgerald would generally retrieve the packages.  
Shepherd further testified that Fitzgerald would sometimes sell the packages 
directly, while on other occasions they would meet and divide the contents.  Cash 
would then be sent back to Fuller.  Shepherd and Fitzgerald would tell Fuller how 
much cash to expect.  The payment would include Fuller’s profits for his cocaine, 
as well as Shepherd’s and Fitzgerald’s payment for the next shipment. 
Following Shepherd’s arrest, Fitzgerald engaged in at least one more 
transaction with Fuller.  Fuller testified that Fitzgerald met him in Tennessee and 
accepted two kilograms of cocaine in return for money Shepherd had paid Fuller 
just prior to Shepherd’s arrest.  Fitzgerald’s travel to Tennessee is confirmed by 
phone records.  The nature of the transaction is corroborated by a contemporaneous 
conversation Fuller had with Shepherd, which was recorded and played for the jury 
at trial. 
Eventually, the conspiracy drew the attention of law enforcement.  At trial, 
Special Agent Scott Duffy testified that the FBI took note of a pattern of packages 
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with similar features, namely the use of stolen corporate account numbers to pay 
for the shipment, similar origin and destination addresses, and similar delivery 
instructions.  In August 2006, the FBI discovered that two packages fitting the 
observed pattern were in transit to locations in Delaware.  Testimony by Fuller 
confirmed that he personally shipped those packages and that two or three 
kilograms of cocaine were contained in each package.  DEA Task Force Officer 
Lawrence Collins testified that on August 24, 2006, he surveilled the first 
Delaware location, observed the delivery of a FedEx package, and then observed 
Fitzgerald enter the building and exit with a FedEx package.  Robert Shepherd was 
present in his own vehicle, and the officer observed a brief meeting between the 
two.  A similar delivery occurred two days later.  Officer Collins and FBI Special 
Agent Michelle Taylor testified as to Fitzgerald’s arrival at the package’s 
destination and his eventual departure with the package.  A note addressed to the 
FedEx driver and the FedEx door tag were retrieved from that location.  Both bore 
Fitzgerald’s fingerprints. 
Fitzgerald was indicted and tried on four counts:  Count I, conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846; Counts II and III, 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B); and Count IV, conspiracy to commit money 
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956.  The jury convicted him on all counts.  
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This timely appeal followed.  Fitzgerald raises six discrete issues that allegedly 
undermine his conviction.  We will address each in turn.   
First, Fitzgerald questions the sufficiency of the evidence as to his 
conviction on Count I, conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 841 and 846.  We exercise plenary review following denial of a Rule 29 motion 
for judgment of acquittal, but we apply the same standard as the District Court 
must apply following a jury conviction.  See United States v. Tyson, 653 F.3d 192, 
199 (3d Cir. 2011).  Therefore, we will “sustain the verdict if there is substantial 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, to uphold the 
jury’s decision.”  Id. at 199 (quoting United States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 154 (3d 
Cir. 2006)). 
In this case, we have no doubt the evidence was sufficient to support the 
jury’s verdict.  The Government has presented evidence – including fingerprint 
evidence and direct observation by government agents – that Fitzgerald was 
personally involved in the retrieval of at least two packages containing substantial 
quantities of cocaine.  It has presented shipping receipts and supporting testimony 
demonstrating frequent shipment of similar packages.  Fitzgerald’s co-conspirators 
have offered testimony as to his relationship and involvement with them before the 
conspiracy and his deep involvement in the conspiracy itself.  Some of this 
evidence was corroborated by phone records and recorded phone conversations. 
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Fitzgerald cites our decision in United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 195 
(3d Cir. 1999), and similar cases, and argues that he was in a mere “buyer-seller” 
relationship and not part of a larger conspiracy.  But the evidence clearly satisfies 
Gibbs because it demonstrates that Fitzgerald “purchased drugs from the 
conspiracy and . . . knew that the individual from whom he purchased the drugs 
was part of a larger drug operation.”  Id.  The evidence also goes well beyond 
Gibbs’ requirements, demonstrating that Fitzgerald was not merely a peripheral 
player, but a core conspirator.  Among other activities, he supplied his own money 
to purchase bulk quantities of drugs, coordinated shipments of drugs and money, 
scouted locations to receive shipments, and actually retrieved shipments himself.  
This is no mere buyer-seller relationship.  It is, in fact, difficult to conceive of a 
more integral role. 
Second, Fitzgerald questions the sufficiency of the evidence as to his 
conviction on Count IV, conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1956.  The Government presented evidence that Fitzgerald was involved 
in concealing money – both his own and money belonging to co-conspirators – and 
sending it to his supplier to receive additional drugs.  Fitzgerald claims that 
movement or payment of money is a necessary component of participation in drug 
crimes.  He contends that while it might constitute additional evidence of drug 
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crimes, this evidence is insufficient to sustain the independent charge of money 
laundering. 
But money laundering includes knowingly conducting a financial transaction 
using the proceeds of unlawful activity “with the intent to promote the carrying on 
of . . . unlawful activity[.]”  18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).  “We have regularly 
upheld money laundering prosecutions based on the reinvestment (‘plowing back’) 
of proceeds.”  United States v. Grasso, 381 F.3d 160, 169 (3d Cir. 2004), judgment 
vacated on other grounds, 544 U.S. 945 (2005).  The Government presented 
evidence that Shepherd, Fitzgerald, and their co-conspirators concealed and 
shipped large amounts of money across the country to facilitate the ongoing 
operation of the criminal conspiracy.  Courts have recognized that “[p]ayment for 
drugs may constitute ‘promotion’ for the purposes of the money laundering statute 
when such payment encourages further drug transactions.”  United States v. King, 
169 F.3d 1035, 1039 (6th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Bueno, 585 F.3d 847 
(5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Krasinski, 545 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Torres, 53 F.3d 1129, 1137 n.6 (10th Cir. 1995). 
Third, Fitzgerald questions the sufficiency of the evidence as to his 
conviction for Counts II and III, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B).  These counts deal 
specifically with the packages Fitzgerald was observed retrieving from the two 
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Delaware locations in August 2006.  Again, we will “sustain the verdict if there is 
substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, to 
uphold the jury’s decision.”  Tyson, 653 F.3d at 199 (quoting Flores, 454 F.3d at 
154).  In addition, because Fitzgerald failed to preserve these objections before the 
District Court, we will reverse only if there was plain error.  See United States v. 
Barel, 939 F.2d 26, 37 (3d Cir. 1991).  As we have discussed, the Government has 
presented evidence – including fingerprint evidence and direct observation by 
government agents – that Fitzgerald was personally involved in the retrieval of the 
two packages.  Fuller testified that he personally shipped them and that they 
contained two or three kilograms of cocaine each.  Fitzgerald’s knowledge of their 
contents can be inferred from his knowledge of the contents of similar packages 
shipped throughout the conspiracy.  Given this evidence, there was no plain error 
in the jury’s verdict. 
Fourth, Fitzgerald challenges the District Court’s refusal to declare a mistrial 
after Fuller testified:  “I didn’t want to agree [to cooperate with the Government], 
because I was in fear of my family being in danger and myself.”  We review “the 
denial of a motion for a mistrial based on a witness’s allegedly prejudicial 
comments for an abuse of discretion.”  United States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 207 
(3d Cir. 2005).  Fitzgerald claims that this statement prejudiced the jury to believe 
that Fitzgerald had threatened Fuller, and that Fuller was in fear for his life.  We 
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disagree.  Even standing alone, the statement is not prejudicial to Fitzgerald.  It is 
natural that a drug conspirator would fear retaliation – from suppliers, co-
conspirators, and any number of other sources – for cooperating with the police.  
Fuller does not state that Fitzgerald made him fear for his life, and the jury would 
not necessarily assume such a fact absent more information. 
But Fitzgerald’s challenge of his conviction on this point is not merely weak, 
it is frivolous.  Fitzgerald’s counsel challenged the statement at trial and requested 
a mistrial.  The Government correctly suspected that the witness was in fact 
referring to his fear of retaliation from Mexican cartel members.  The District 
Court wisely gave the Government the opportunity to “clean up” the testimony, 
and the Government did so.  The witness further testified: 
Q.  Mr. Fuller, without necessarily going into specifics, where are you 
generally obtaining the cocaine that you were involved in 
distributing? 
A.  From the Mexican cartel. 
Q.  Do you consider those people to be dangerous people? 
A.  Yes, ma’am. 
Q.  When you referred to being afraid of retribution, were you afraid 
of those people? 
A.  Yes. 
 
This clarifying testimony – which goes curiously unmentioned in Fitzgerald’s brief 
– makes this challenge frivolous. 
Fifth, Fitzgerald challenges the admission of evidence of a continuous 
relationship between himself and his co-conspirators.  Fitzgerald asserts that the 
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pre-conspiracy evidence offered by the Government is inadmissible under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 404(b), which bars evidence offered to prove that a person 
committed a crime based on their propensity to commit similar crimes.  But such 
evidence is admissible if it is intrinsic rather than extrinsic evidence, that is, if it is 
“part and parcel of the charged offense.”  United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 
245 (3d Cir. 2010).  Intrinsic evidence is permitted because “there is no ‘other’ 
wrongful conduct at issue”; all the evidence offered is offered for the purpose of 
proving one of the elements of the charged offense.  Id.; see United States v. Cross, 
308 F.3d 308, 320 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[A]cts are intrinsic when they directly prove 
the charged conspiracy.”). 
The Government argues that the pre-conspiracy evidence offered here is 
intrinsic evidence, and thus admissible.  We agree.  “The essential elements of a 
drug distribution conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 are:  ‘(1) a shared unity of 
purpose, (2) an intent to achieve a common goal, and (3) an agreement to work 
together toward the goal.’”  United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 
2008) (quoting United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir. 2006)).  
Evidence of Fitzgerald’s prior relationship with his co-conspirators and his active 
engagement in the same criminal conduct using the same methods supports the 
jury’s conclusion that he shared with them a unified purpose of conducting a drug 
distribution conspiracy and an intent to achieve that goal, and that they worked 
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together to reach it.  It also confirms that he was aware of the contents of packages 
he shipped and received. 
Finally, Fitzgerald challenges whether there was sufficient evidence of 
conspiracy to admit the testimony of his co-conspirators.  Statements “made by a 
party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy” are not hearsay, 
and are thus admissible as evidence.  Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).  In order for a 
court to admit such statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the party seeking to offer 
the evidence must demonstrate: “(1) that a conspiracy existed; (2) the declarant and 
the party against whom the statement is offered were members of the conspiracy; 
(3) the statement was made in the course of the conspiracy; and (4) the statement 
was made in furtherance of the conspiracy.”  United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 
309, 333 (3d Cir. 1992).  In determining whether the evidence is admissible, the 
court can consider the statements themselves.  Id. at 334. 
While Fitzgerald asserts that “the Government failed to demonstrate the first 
element under the . . . McGlory standard,” Appellant’s Br. at 38, it is clear that he 
is in fact challenging the second element of the standard, his involvement in the 
conspiracy.  Fitzgerald offers no argument that Shepherd and Fuller did not engage 
in a drug distribution conspiracy; he offers no argument that the statements were 
not made; and he offers no argument that the statements were not made in 
furtherance of the conspiracy.  Fitzgerald only challenges his involvement in the 
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conspiracy.  See id. (“Mr. Fitzgerald never entered into anything more than a mere 
sales agreement with Mr. Shepherd and/or Mr. Fuller to purchase cocaine in an 
individual capacity.”).  But as we have detailed above, there was ample evidence to 
conclude that Fitzgerald was a knowing and active participant in the conspiracy. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will uphold the jury’s verdict and affirm Mr. 
Fitzgerald’s conviction on all four counts. 
